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In this paper I present a theory to highlight similarities and differences in meaning 
for various modals in English, in order to account for three sets of facts: modal 
cooccurrence facts, sequencing preferences between modals, and finally, a difference 
in strength between the modals must and should. Modal cooccurrence facts have to 
do with which modals can be used together in conjoined sentences, and which can 
never be used together. Sequencing preferences have to do with the order in which 
modals in conjoined sentences appear. As for the difference between must and 
should, the puzzle here is why these modals are not synonymous, given that they are 
both strong modals with either deontic or circumstantial readings. My aim will be to 
give an account that stays as much as possible within a standard theory of modals, 
using only mechanisms provided in that theory - quantificational force, a modal 
base, and an ordering source - and proposing at most minimal changes to how these 
work. 
My thesis is that the meanings of certain modals are interrelated. Not only do 
these modals, under particular readings, share the same modal base, but the ordering 
sources by which modal base worlds are ordered work in a hierarchical fashion with 
respect to each other. The point of the hierarchy is that an ordering can only order 
worlds left as ties by any higher ranked orderings. A lower ordering can never 
reorder the worlds ordered by a higher one. 
This hierarchical arrangement helps explain the sets of facts just mentioned. 
Modal sentences can be conjoined only when the meanings do not clash, as dictated 
by the ordering source hierarchy. Sequencing preferences respect a requirement that 
a less informative statement precede a more informative one, if we allow that the 
degree of informativity is established not only by quantificational force but by the 
ordering source hierarchy. Finally, the difference in meaning between must and 
should is to be found in the participation of must in the hierarchy, and the exclusion 
of should. In section 1 ofthis paper, I will be making these hypotheses more explicit. 
An outcome of my theory is the claim that must implies will, and this has 
proven to be controversial. By the way I have set things up, the claim is deduced 
from the theory and therefore is a way of testing it. But as the original facts I set out 
to explain are quite robust, and the theory to explain them is quite simple, why 
should an implication of the theory seem false? 
The reason, I will argue, is that my claim only extends to circumstantial or 
deontic must, and not a reading of must which is teleological . The teleological 
reading occurs in a variety of sentence types and has tended to be overlooked, but it 
is salient enough to complicate judgements of modal entailment. In section 2 of this 
paper, I will examine some of the contexts in which must has a teleological reading. I 
will offer a suggestion of how this modal is to be interpreted, and I will show how 
teleological must cannot be expected to imply will because that modal has no 
teleological reading. 
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1.  A Ranking of Orderings 
1 .1 .  The Facts to Explain 
Some modal combinations are common, such as those seen in examples in ( 1 -5) 
which are found frequently. 
( 1 )  I can and 1 will. 
(2) We must and we will . 
(3) We can and we must. 
(4) We cannot and we will not. 
(5) (He said) 1 may and (in fact) I will. 
Other combinations are never found. Examples such as those in (6-9) are completely 
ruled out. 
(6) #1 can't but ! will. 
(7) #1 must but 1 might not. 
(8) #We cannot but we must. 
(9) #We must but we won't. 
For those combinations that are permissible, there is a sequencing preference, 
as shown in examples ( 1 0- 1 3). 
( 1 0) ?We will and we can. 
( 1 1 )  ?We will and we must. 
( 1 2) ?We must and we can. 
( 1 3) ?We will not and we cannot. 
( 14) ?I will and (in fact) 1 may. 
These examples contrast with ( 1 -5) which exhibit the preferred sequencing. The 
contrast between the two sets of sentences seems fairly robust, even if the 
dispreferred options are more odd than completely unacceptable. 
At this point we may ask, why should some modals be incompatible, or 
certain orders of presentation dispreferred, unless the meanings of the modals is 
related in some way? 
I am also interested in a difference in the urgency between deontic or 
circumstantial must versus the modal should under related deontic or circumstantial 
readings. The intuition to capture is that must (colloquially have to) is binding in the 
way that should is not, as seen in ( 1 5) versus ( 1 6) . 
( 1 5) I have to fix the tail light. 
( 16) I should fix the tail light. 
In ( 1 5), the implication is that the speaker has no choice but to fix the tail light. ( 1 6) 
suggests there is a moral or practical advantage to fixing the tail light, but it is left 
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open whether or not the speaker is going to do it. 
The contrast between ( 1 7) and ( 1 8) reinforces the point. 
( 1 7) #1 have to fix the tail light but I'm not going to. 
( 1 8) I should fix the tail light but I'm not going to. 
Nothing is strange about ( 1 8), but ( 1 7) is ruled out. The clash in ( 17) is apparently 
between have to (must) and not going to, or equivalently, won 't. (In this paper 1 
assume that will and be going to have the same meaning.) Saying that one has to or 
must do something seems to entail that they will do it. 
A similar kind of fact is observed with past tense modals. Consider the 
contrast between ( 1 9) and (20) or (2 1 ). 
( 1 9) #1 had to cook dinner last night, but 1 didn't. 
(20) I should have cooked dinner last night, but I didn't. 
(2 1 )  I was suppose t o  cook dinner last night, but I didn't. 
Saying that I had to cook dinner apparently entails that I did so. The modal in the 
past tense still carries the meaning of inevitability. (20) or (2 1 ), on the other hand, 
are acceptable. Here, 1 am supposing that should have is a past tense form of should, 
but the same thing holds for the modal expression was supposed to. That is, these 
expressions do not carry the meaning of inevitability. 
Again we may raise a question. Given the standard theory of modals in which 
must and should have virtually the same semantic content, where does the additional 
meaning of inevitability for must come from? 
1 .2. Modal Theory 
We need a theory for modals, and the theory I start with is the one developed in 
Kratzer ( 1 98 1 )  and Kratzer ( 1 99 1 ), and elsewhere in Kratzer's  work. The theory 
attributes to each modal a quantificational force that is unchanging across different 
occasions of use, and two conversational backgrounds - a modal base and an 
ordering source - that are contextually variant. A conversational background is a 
function from a world to a set of propositions, where a proposition is identified with 
a set of worlds. For a modal base f, f(w*) is a set of propositions and nf(w*) is a set 
of worlds. I ' ll be calling these worlds MBw' with the subscript w* for the world of 
utterance suppressed. MB can be epistemic or circumstantial . For an ordering source 
g, g(w*) is a set of propositions. The basic idea of ordering is that for two worlds in 
w and w' E MB, and ordering source g(w*), w <g(w') w' just in case the set of g(w*)­
propositions to which w' belongs is a proper subset of the set of g(w*)-propositions 
to which w belongs. 
As explained in Kratzer ( 1 98 1 )  and ( 1 99 1 ), modal readings depend on the 
interaction of the modal base and the ordering source.  For Kratzer, the modal base 
can be epistemic or circumstantial, and ordering sources can be stereotypical, 
deontic, or empty. Kratzer ( 1 99 1 )  discusses a stereotypical ordering source 
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associated with an epistemic modal base. A stereotypical ordering source orders 
things according to how well they conform to 'the normal course of events ' .  
Circumstantial readings in Kratzer's theory are derived from a circumstantial modal 
base combined with a null ordering source. A circumstantial base is a set offacts that 
makes things possible or necessary, in that theory, and the null ordering source 
imposes no ordering on these worlds. 
I will introduce certain adaptations to the theory, in part to capture certain 
intuitions about indeterminism and in part to allow for a greater integration of the 
meanings of modaIs. To begin with, let conversational backgrounds take worlds and 
times as arguments. We will still have epistemic modal bases, but instead of a 
circumstantial modal base, we have a totally realistic modal base up to a time: fTR. 
fTR(w* ,t) is a set of propositions that exhaustively characterize w* up to time t. 
nfTR(w*,t) is the set of worlds containing w* that branch at t, since the exhaustive 
description ofw* up to t pertains to all the worlds that overlap w* up to t. This is the 
modal base for all the readings I consider in this paper, and I do not consider modals 
with epistemic readings. 
The totally realistic modal base up to the time 0 f speech is represented in the 
figure I .  
Figure 1 i«WI , W2 , , , , W3 , I 
WI, W2, and W3 are worlds that branch at t and that are identical up to t; these are 
proxies for the actual world at t, assuming that we inhabit this broomstick. 
To get the relevant modal readings, MB is the set of branching worlds, and 
the difference between circumstantial, deontic, and stereotypical readings will come 
down to a matter of ordering source. Deontic (D) is some set of normative 
statements, or rules. Circumstantial (C) is a set of things like physical and biological 
laws. This is different than Kratzer's theory where circumstantial readings involve an 
empty ordering source. 
The stereotypical ordering (S) also requires some comment. As in Kratzer' s  
theory, the stereotypical ordering source i s  concerned with the normal course of 
things, but what is crucial here is which MB worlds are S-best. According to the 
picture of branching worlds, there is no actual world until the end oftime, if there is 
an end of time. At speech time t, we can't refer to w i ,  w2, or w3 as the actual world. 
But any ofthese worlds will serve just as well as the actual world, so I call the whole 
bundle of branching worlds the set of proxies for the actual world at t. This set, I 
assume, contains wildly implausible worlds that don't represent real possibilities. 
The S-best worlds are just those worlds that are real possibilities, real candidates to 
eventually be the actual world. Any of the S-best worlds at t could finally be the 
actual world, but worlds that are not S-best at t haven't got a chance. 
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1 .3. Explaining Modal Cooccurrences 
To account for the data I looked at earlier, I assume all the relevant modal readings 
involve the same modal base, and that there is a hierarchy of orderings which ranks 
the circumstantial, deontic, and stereotypical orderings with respect to each other. 
In (22), I spell out my assumptions about which ordering sources are 
associated with which modals, and which modals are duals to each other. 
(22) 
Stereotypical Deontic Circumstantial 
Universal will must must 
Existential may/might may (can) can 
All the modals on the chart have the same MB - totally realistic up to the time of 
speech. Columns show ordering source, as labeled at the top, and rows show 
quantificational force, as labeled at the side. Modals in the same column but different 
rows are duals. 
The hierarchy of ordering sources I assume is as in (23). 
(23) S < D < C  
By this ranking, the circumstantial ordering is the highest, and trumps the deontic 
and the stereotypical. Likewise, the deontic trumps the stereotypical. The idea 
behind the hierarchy is this: a lower ranked ordering cannot rearrange worlds ordered 
by a higher ranked ordering - at best it can offer a refmement. Another way to put it 
is that a lower ranked ordering can only order worlds that are ties with respect to a 
higher ranked ordering. A consequence of the hierarchy is that rankings between 
worlds in the modal base are passed down from higher ranked orderings to lower 
ranked orderings. In other words, if A < B, then w <B W ' � W <A w' ,  or, if B is 
higher than A, w is B-better than w' only if w is A-better than w ' .  
The intuition behind this setup i s  mostly common sense. Some laws or 
regularities tolerate no exceptions, while others do. Scientific laws (physical, 
biological, and so on) are the strongest. They are stronger than moral laws - you can 
hardly have a moral law that requires you to do what is physically impossible. They 
are stronger than human will - we cannot choose not to obey the law of gravity, for 
example. Moral laws ofthe sort found in D are meant to overrule human tendencies. 
Of course, there is a question of whether there is ever a moral law can overrule 
human tendencies. This is a matter I return to. 
Now to the cooccurrence and non-cooccurrence facts. These come about by 
entailments between modals, and we are now ready to see how the ranking in (23) 
gets the right entailments. (I am assuming a version of modal theory in which there 
are best worlds for a given ordering source.) 
The ranking imposes subset relations between modal base worlds best with 
respect to the given orderings. Start with the ranking between S and D. Since S < D, 
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S can only impose further ordering on worlds that are ties with respect to D. That 
means that all S-best worlds in MB are also D-best worlds, but any given D-best 
world in MB is not necessarily S-best. Next, the ranking between D and C.  Since D < 
C, D can only impose further ordering on worlds that are ties with respect to C. That 
means that all D-best worlds in MB are also C-best worlds, but any given C-best 
world in MB is not necessarily D-best. Finally, since S < C, S can only impose 
further ordering on worlds that are ties with respect to C. All S-best worlds in MB 
are also C-best worlds, but any given C-best world in MB is not necessarily S-best. 
What we can't do is simply add lower ranked ordering source propositions to 
a higher ranked ordering source. Because ordering depends on the sheer number of 
propositions true in a world, if we just added propositions together, we would risk 
having a lower ranked ordering change an ordering imposed by a higher ranked 
source. The facts I 'm looking at wouldn't follow from such a setup. 
Notice that for explaining differences between modals in the same column, 
duals, the hierarchy has no role to play. There is no difficulty in explaining (3) .  
(3) We can and we must. 
Here, the modals both have the same modal base and same ordering source. It is no 
contradiction to say that one C-best world in MB is <p, and all C-best worlds in MB 
are <p, although it may be redundant to do so. I return to the issue of redundancy later. 
And of course, (8) is bad for the very reason that these modals are duals. 
(8) #We cannot but we must. 
The hierarchy does help explain cooccurrence examples and non­
cooccurrences examples for modal pairs across different columns of the chart in (22). 
Start with (1), repeated here. 
( 1 ) I can and I will. 
'Can <p' is true iff there is a C-best world in MB which is a <p world, and 'will <p' is 
true iff all S-best worlds in MB are <p worlds. (1 ignore the issue of the temporal 
interpretation in this paper.) Since all S-best worlds are C-best worlds, if all S-best 
worlds are <p, then at least one C-best world is <p, and the cooccurrence in ( 1 )  is 
explained. 
In the same way, we can explain the contrast between (6), repeated here, and 
(24). 
(6) #1 can't but I will. 
(24) I can but I won't. 
Starting with (6), if all S-best worlds are <p-worlds, but no C-best worlds is a <p­
world, we have a contradiction. As for (24), it is  perfectly possible that no S-best 
world is <p while at least one C-best world is <po  No contradiction is involved and the 
sentence is good. 
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Similarly, since all S-best worlds in MB are C-best worlds, if all C-best 
worlds are cp, then so are all S-best worlds, and (2) should be good, and (9) should be 
bad. 
(2) We must and we will . 
(9) #We must but we won't. 
That prediction is borne out. 
1 .4. Explaining Sequencing Preferences 
Modal cooccurrences appear in special environments, such as speeches, editorials, 
and so on. Their purpose appears to be rhetorical .  They are used for a kind of 
emphasis, and by our theory, they should be redundant, as we see when we 
reconsider (I ). 
( I )  I can and I will. 
The sentence in ( I )  says that at least one C-best world is cp and all S-best worlds are 
cpo But if all S-best worlds are cp, then at least one C-best world is cpo Why bother 
saying so, unless the intent is rhetorical? 
In explaining sequencing preferences, it should be observed that duals behave 
differently than non-duals. If the modals are duals and the cooccurrence is allowed at 
all, it appears that quantificational force makes a difference in the sequencing. This 
can be seen by comparing (3) and (12). 
(3) We can and we must. 
( 1 2) ?We must and we can. 
It appears that the existential modal has to come first. can comes before must and not 
the reverse. 
However, if the pair are not duals, quantificational force is not the only factor 
is determining the sequence. Consider the following examples. 
( I )  I can and I will. 
(2) We must and we will .  
Existential can is before universal will, but universal must is also before universal 
will. From these examples, it appears that the modal associated with the higher 
ranked ordering must come first. 
An explanation for these facts can be given in terms of informativity. The 
rule seems to be that the less informative modal statement should come first. If the 
modals are duals, the difference is in quantificational force.  An existential modal is 
less informative than a universal modal in the sense that saying something about 
some members of a set is less informative than saying something about all members 
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of the set. Therefore, the existential modal should come first. 
Informativity also may be at work in the hierarchy. A lower ranked ordering 
cannot change the ordering imposed by a higher ranked ordering, but it can impose a 
further ordering on any worlds that have been left as ties. In that way, a lower ranked 
ordering is more informative that a higher ranked ordering. By the principle that the 
less informative modal statement should come first, when the quantificational force 
is the same, the modal associated with the higher ranked ordering should come first. 
That is what we see in (2). 
We have not considered any cases which contain a lower ranked modal with 
existential force and a higher ranked modal with universal force. Here are two 
examples to consider, although both seem bad. 
(25) ?John might go, and he must. 
(26) ?John must go, and he might. 
(25) involves an existential modal with an S ordering, followed by a universal modal 
with a D or C ordering, and (26) the reverse. In lieu of a more careful examination 
of the facts, it appears that the two constraints are working at cross purposes in these 
examples. (25) correctly involves the existential modal coming first, but the higher 
ranked modal comes second. (26) correctly involves the higher ranked modal coming 
first, but the existential modal comes second. That both sequences are odd can be 
seen as preliminary support for the informativity account I have given here. 
1 .5. Explaining the Difference Between should And must 
We come to our last topic in this initial discussion - the difference in urgency 
between must and should. That difference is illustrated in ( 1 7) versus ( 1 8), repeated 
here, in which have to is considered a colloquial variant of must. 
( 1 7) #1 have to fix the tail light but I'm not going to. 
( 1 8) I should fix the tail light but I'm not going to. 
That have to is more urgent than should is shown by its incompatibility with not 
going to. If you accept that you have to change the tail light, you accept the urgency 
or inevitability of the task, and it makes no sense to say that you won't  do it. If you 
merely accept that you should change the light, you still give yourself the option of 
not carrying out that action. 
To capture this difference, let us say that for must or have to, the ordering 
source is D or C, depending on whether the reading is deontic or circumstantial. D 
and C are part of the hierarchy in (23), and the entailments to will (or be going to) 
follow. Furthermore, we posit that should is associated with different orderings, that 
although may be deontic or circumstantial are not part of the hierarchy. What 
matters in particular is that the orderings associated with should are unrelated to the 
orderings associated with will or might. As a consequence, should is less binding, 
and you don't get the same behavior with this modal as with must. 
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It follows from the non-participation of should in the ordering source 
hierarchy that this modal is used only to chose between live options, to mark one of 
these as more advantageous in a moral or practical sense. For example, in ( 1 8), both 
the option of changing the tail light and not changing it are in play, and we are only 
marking one of these as better. The nonnative force of should, whatever it is, does 
not overrule human choice, and this is captured theoretically by excluding it from the 
hierarchy. 
We can also mention the contrast between ( 1 9) and (20) or (2 1 ), with the 
examples repeated here. 
( 1 9) #1 had to cook dinner last night, but 1 didn't. 
(20) 1 should have cooked dinner last night, but I didn't. 
(2 1 )  1 was suppose to cook dinner last night, but 1 didn't. 
In ( 1 9), the modal base under consideration is a set of worlds that branch at a time 
prior to last night. In all the D-best or C-best of these, depending on whether had to 
in this case is deontic or circumstantial, I cook dinner. But that means, by the 
hierarchy, that all the S-best worlds are worlds where I cook dinner. Since we have 
assumed that the actual world comes from this set of S-best worlds, the worlds that 
remain as of the speech time in ( 1 9) must be worlds in which 1 did cook dinner last 
night. That is why the sentence is ruled out. 
Since we assume that should, and it appears is supposed to, involves ordering 
sources outside this hierarchy, there is no entailment that I did cook dinner, and (20) 
and (2 1 )  are not ruled out. 
2. Speaker Nominated Telos and Teleological must 
A consequence of the theory is that must, circumstantial or deontic,  implies 
stereotypical will, the ordinary future modal. This consequence was revealed in the 
explanation of why examples like (9) are not good. 
(9) #We must but we won't. 
All S-best worlds in MB are C-best worlds, so it can't simultaneously be the case 
that all C-best worlds are <p but no S-best worlds are <po But if all S-best worlds in 
MB are C-best worlds, must entails will. 
However, as mentioned, this result is controversial and the opinion has been 
expressed to me that must could not possible entail will. I think there are two reasons 
that judgements on this issue are less than clear. The first is that saying there is an 
entailment to a will sentence doesn't mean that the will sentence is true. The must 
sentence itself may be false. This is shown in the following dialogue. 
(27) A: 
B: 
You must clean out the sink. 
I" won't do it. 
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In this dialogue, B denies the entailment of A's remark that B will clean out the sink. 
This denial amounts to the claim that what A has said is false. This is a common sort 
of exchange and it doesn't render the claim that must entails will false. 
A second reason is that there is a separate kind of must which is not merely 
circumstantial but circumstantiaVteleological. My claim does not extend to this 
interpretation of must because for one thing, there does not appear to be a 
teleological will. The teleological must, appearing as it does in special contexts, has 
been insufficiently appreciated and I propose looking at some of those contexts here. 
Consider the sentences in (28-30), all apparent counterexamples to the claim 
that must implies will. 
(28) John must call the plumber or the pipes will burst. 
(29) Mr. Bush must. . .overcome approval ratings stuck near 50 percent, a united 
Democratic opposition, and Congressional Republicans for whom the 
President's  proposals have little upside. 
(NYTimes, 2/6/05 Wk 3) 
(30) The Syrians must remove their troops as well as their intelligence 
services.(3/9/05) 
The disjunction in (28) leaves open the possibility that John won't call the plumber 
and that the pipes will burst, so it does not imply that John will call the plumber. The 
sentence in (29) appears within a discussion of whether the President will be able to 
put into place his Social Security plan. The remark is not meant to suggest that he 
actually will unstick his approval ratings, beat the Democrats, or persuade the 
Republicans, but only that those things must be done to realize the plan. And (30), a 
comment by the President, doesn't sound like a guarantee that the Syrian government 
will remove their troops from Lebanon. 
2. 1.  Disjunction 
Consider again (28), repeated here. 
(28) John must call the plumber or the pipes will burst. 
In this sentence, we have disjunction between two modal sentences, but the modals 
are different. (28) does not entail that John will call the plumber since the possibility 
of his not calling the plumber and letting the pipes burst is explicitly mentioned. But 
the meaning of this sentence is a puzzle for our semantic theory. The question is how 
modals interact semantically with disjunction. How are the worlds in the modal base 
to be divided up for both modals to quantify over? 
A related sentence is found in (3 1) .  
(3 1 )  John will call the plumber or the pipes will burst. 
Simons (2005) suggests an A TB strategy which puts the modal under the scope of 
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the disjunction. By such an approach, (3 1 )  would mean that the S-best worlds in MB 
are either worlds where John calls the plumber or worlds where the pipes burst. (3 1 )  
doesn't entail that John will call the plumber. It doesn't even involve a guarantee that 
the pipes won't burst ifhe calls the plumber. What it does say is that in all worlds in 
which the pipes don't burst, John calls the plumber.That means John had better call 
the plumber. 
An ATB strategy is ruled out for (28), as the modals in the disjuncts are 
different, but we may take a hint from this analysis. (28) is also about two future 
possibilities - that John calls the plumber or that the pipes burst. Once again, maybe 
the pipes will burst even ifhe calls the plumber. What is crucial, however, is that in 
all the worlds in which the pipes don't burst, John calls the plumber. That again 
means he'd better call the plumber, but this time, this is not merely an implicit 
suggestion.(28) is more of an urgent recommendation. The urgency is part of the 
meaning of the sentence. 
Here is what I want to say about (28). The second disjunct in (28) establishes 
that the S-best worlds in MB are divided into worlds in which the pipes burst and 
worlds in which the pipes don't burst. The first disjunct in (28) then is to be 
interpreted with respect to those worlds in MB in which the pipes don't burst. What 
is the ordering source to be? It is circumstantial in that by the laws of physics, etc . ,  
the pipes don't burst only when they are fixed by a plumber. It  is teleological in that 
the relevant laws are specific to a particular outcome. What (28) means therefore is 
that in the best worlds in MB in which the pipes don't burst - best by the laws 
determining this outcome - John calls the plumber. 
I believe that this accords with our intuitions about the sentence. The 
sentence does not mean that John is simply forced to call the plumber, as it would 
with simply a circumstantial reading of must. The sentence allows that John is free to 
not call the plumber and let the pipes burst. But given the goal of preventing the 
pipes from bursting, the sentence says that John does not have a choice but to call the 
plumber. Notice that nothing is said about John's goals . Even ifhe wants the pipes to 
burst, the sentence can be true. 
This particular interpretation is invoked by the modal/disjunction structure 
we see in (28) where must is found in the first disjunct and will is found in the 
second. By the interpretative strategy required, worlds with certain, often aversive, 
consequences are removed from the modal base. Next the remaining worlds are 
ordered by the circumstantial-teleological ordering. This meaning is reminiscent of 
Kratzer's approach to conditionals. In Kratzer ( 199 1 ), a conditional is analyzed as a 
modal statement with the denotation of the if clause added to the modal base. (32) is  
adapted from that paper. 
(32) [if a, must �jf,g = [must �t,g, where for all W E  W, f'(w) = few) u { [ajf,g} .  
The crucial thing is that the antecedent fact is added to the modal base, not as a 
lasting update, but just long enough to work out its consequences. 
We need something similar here. The following shows in part how we want 
to analyze (28). 
(33) 
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[must a or will f:I)f,g = [must at-g, where for all W E  W, r'(w) = few) u {W ­
[f:I)f,g} and g is circumstantial/teleological. 
This says that we add the complement of the proposition embedded under will to the 
modal base and interpret the first disjunct against a background of worlds in which 
the pipes do not burst. Something should also be said about the temporal 
interpretation of the sentence, since we are interested only in worlds in which the 
pipes don't burst in the future. I ignore that problem here. 
I call the relevant reading in this sentence a Speaker Nominated Telos (SNT) 
reading. An SNT reading involves a proposal by the speaker of some result for 
consideration, though not a result that is necessarily an aim of the designated agent 
of the sentence. SNT always require a modal with a circumstantial/teleological 
reading. A disjunction of the sort in (28) brings about as SNT reading by mentioning 
in the second disjunct the consequence which is being avoided. But it appears that 
disjunction is only one of several devices in natural language to bring ab9ut SNT 
readings. We tum directly to another. 
2.2. In order to Clauses 
We return to (29). 
(29) Mr. Bush must. . .overcome approval ratings stuck near 50 percent, a united 
Democratic opposition, and Congressional Republicans for whom the 
President's  proposals have little upside. 
(NYTimes, 2/6/05 Wk 3) 
This sentence appears within a discussion of the likelihood ofthe President passing 
his plan for private Social Security accounts for retiring Americans. Given that 
context, the sentence does not imply that Mr. Bush will actually overcome the 
obstacles mentioned, but only says that in order to win approval for them, he needs to 
do those things. This meaning can be made explicit by adding an in order to clause, 
as in (34). 
(34) In order to pass his private accounts plan, Mr. Bush must overcome approval 
ratings stuck near 50 percent, a united Democratic opposition, and 
Congressional Republicans for whom the President' s  proposals have little 
upside. 
Clauses beginning with in order to are sometimes called rationale c lauses, 
but in (34) that label doesn't seem right. By the meaning of the sentence, the 
obstacles really must be overcome to pass the private accounts plan and it is not a 
question of Mr, Bush merely believing they do. 
That there is a reading for in order to clauses besides the agent's  rationale is 
made clear in (35). 
(35) In order for me to sell those stocks, their price must double. 
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The in order to clause in (35) cannot be a rationale clause. My selling the stocks can 
in no way be a rationale for the price ofthe stocks doubling. That is something which 
happens independently of anybody' s intent. 
The interpretation of both sentences seems to involve a particular outcome 
proposed by the speaker for consideration. In (34), the outcome is the passing of the 
private accounts plan. In (35), the outcome is my selling the stocks. Both sentences 
are talking about what is needed to achieve this proposed result - overcoming a set of 
obstacles in the one case, and the price of the stocks doubling in the other. It looks 
like we have more Speaker Nominated Telos readings again. Therefore, I propose 
that an in order to clause is another possible device used to nominate a particular 
telos for consideration. 
One way to make the SNT reading of the in order to clause more salient is to 
add the word first to the matrix. Consider, for example, (36), in which the meaning is 
unchanged from (35). 
(36) In order for me to sell those stocks, their price must first double. 
The same test shows that the in order to clause in (34) has an SNT reading. 
(37) In order to pass his private accounts plan, Mr. Bush must first overcome 
approval ratings stuck near 50 percent, a united Democratic opposition, and 
Congressional Republicans for whom the President's  proposals have little 
upside. 
In (37), we have added the word first to the matrix clause without a change of 
meaning from (34). 
Given this reading, the meaning for the sentence will be as follows. 
(38) [must a. [in order to Plt,g = [must arg, where for all W E  W, f'(w) = f(w) u 
{ [Pt-g} and g is circumstantial/teleological . 
The proposition embedded inside the in order to clause is added to the modal base. 
The relevant ordering source is circumstantial-teleological. The sentence indicates 
what is necessary for reaching this outcome. (Once again, I am ignoring the crucial 
issue of how the temporal interpretation gets fixed.) 
Given the meaning for circumstantial-teleological must, we shouldn't expect 
any entailment to will. These sentences say what is required for a particular goal to 
be met and it is hard to imagine what a corresponding sentence containing will would 
mean. As it turns out, in order to clauses in will sentences do not appear to have SNT 
readings. The closest I have been able to get are sentences like (39). 
(39) In order not to bum it, the bread will be taken out of the oven after forty 
minutes. 
But this sentence is in the passive voice and an agent is implied. Even here, the in 
You Do WHAT You GoTTA Do, OR WHY MUST IMPLIES WILL 
order to clause functions as a rationale clause and the rationale is that of the implied 
agent. After all, the sentence does not guarantee that taking the bread out of the oven 
after forty minutes will keep it from burning. 
2. 3. Deontics 
Lastly, I consider the case of deontics. Let's  return to (30). 
(30) The Syrians must remove their troops as well as their intelligence services. 
The intuition about (30) is that it could be a simple moral assertion, but it equally 
could be an implied threat. In other words, the sentence is ambiguous. 
As a simple moral assertion, (30) would imply (40). 
(40) The Syrians will remove their troops as well as their intelligence services. 
(40) is either true or false. If it is false, (30) would also be false. This accords with 
what we have said about deontic must sentences. 
However, (30) could also be read as an implied threat. If we make the threat 
explicit. we end up with a sentence like (41 ) .  
(4 1 )  The Syrians must remove their troops as  well a s  their intelligence services, or 
we will drive them out. 
But now we have a sentence with a familiar pattern. We decided that this 
combination of modals in a disjunctive sentence gives us a Speaker Nominated Telos 
reading and invokes a circumstantial-teleological ordering source. 
Suppose we apply this interpretive strategy to (4 1 ) .  The second disjunct sets 
up a division over the modal base. It says that there are S-best worlds in MB in 
which the US military drives out the Syrian army as well as ones in which they don't. 
The first disjunct is now interpreted against a background of worlds in which the US 
military does not drive the Syrian army out of Lebanon. The best of these, by the 
circumstantial-teleological ordering, are worlds in which Syria voluntarily removes 
its troops and its intelligence forces from Lebanon. The hand of the Syrians is here 
not being forced absolutely, but if they want to avoid a certain consequence, it is 
being forced. 
Sentences like these, ambiguous between a purely deontic reading and a 
circumstantial-teleological reading, are not at all uncommon. A parent may say 
something like (42) to a child. 
(42) You must behave. 
Does this mean the child is under a moral obligation to behave, or does it mean that 
if they don't, they will be punished? I think it carries both meanings. In fact, the 
ambiguity of these sentences makes them quite handy for moralists with real-world 
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power to exact punishment. 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have proposed a hierarchy for modal orderings which accounts for 
some modal cooccurrence facts and helps explain certain sequencing preferences. 
The hierarchy also explains a semantic difference between must and should, two 
modals which, under the relevant readings, appear to have the same quantificational 
force, the same modal base, and either a deontic or a circumstantial ordering source. I 
proposed that the semantic difference between these modals is that must participates 
in the modal hierarchy and therefore carries a sense of inevitability that should lacks. 
One consequence of the theory - that must entails will - seemed at first 
counterintuitive. I defended the claim by arguing that it only extends to 
circumstantial must. In syntactic environments whose interpretation involves a 
Speaker Nominated Telos, must has a circumstantiaVte1eological reading. In such 
cases we don't  expect any entailments to will because will does not appear to have a 
teleological reading. 
We have seen that Speaker Nominated Telos readings are associated with a 
certain kind of disjunct and with some in order to clauses, which can therefore be 
viewed as telic clauses. A parallel between the interpretation of telic clauses and 
conditionals was drawn. Conditionals, in Kratzer's theory, are interpreted by adding 
a proposition to the modal base, and I 've suggested that this is what happens in the 
interpretation of a telic clause. A crucial difference between an if clause and a telic 
clause, however, has to do with the directionality of time. This is the difference in 
whether you are going from a fact forward to its consequences or from a fact back to 
its necessary antecedents, and that is a matter for further research. 
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